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After Russia’s Regional Elections:  
Putin’s Regime on the Path to  
More Repression by András Rácz
In the Russian regional elections on 8 September 2019, the ruling party United Russia 
managed to largely hold on its control over state assemblies and governorships. Even 
in Moscow, where United Russia was significantly weakened, there was no liberal 
breakthrough. But the elections did not solve any of the inherent political and social 
tensions—it only made them more visible. Thus, protest potential is going to remain high, 
which will likely cause the regime to become even more repressive.
On September 8, 2019, regional elections were held in all 
85 regional entities of the Russian Federation. In sixteen 
regions, new governors were elected; elsewhere, mem-
bers of the regional assemblies and local governments 
were chosen. 
Before the elections, representatives of Russia’s ruling 
party United Russia (Edinnaya Rossiya, ER) had enjoyed 
a stable majority in every region. They could also count 
on the cooperation of parties of the so-called systemic 
opposition, i.e. of parties nominally in opposition but 
which de facto belong to the system. At present, three 
parties are considered part of the systemic opposition: 
the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the 
center-right Just Russia party, and the far-right Liberal 
Democratic Party.
The most prominent elections were those for the Mos-
cow City Duma, whose members decide the budget of the 
city, can investigate how it was spent and have the right 
to initiate local laws. Given these wide competences, the 
Kremlin was intent on keeping control and limiting the 
performance of the real, “non-systemic” opposition. 
In July 2019, the electoral committee refused to reg-
ister a total of 57 candidates for the Moscow City Duma 
connected to the non-systemic opposition, formally due 
to a high number of invalid signatures on their recom-
mendation sheets. This affected Aleksei Navalny, Lyubov 
Sobol, Ilya Yashin, and many other emblematic opposi-
tion figures in Moscow. 
According to the election monitoring organization 
Golos, the whole system of registering candidates has 
become an instrument of political control over who can 
be admitted to run in the election. Golos representatives 
also claimed that shortly after restoring Russia’s full 
membership in the Council of Europe, the administrative 
restrictions of the Moscow authorities contradicted the 
basic principles of free elections. 
Restricting the participation of opposition politicians 
was not the only tool in the Kremlin’s electoral strategy. 
As the popularity of the ruling party United Russia has 
been falling to critical levels due to economic hardship 
and anger over widespread corruption, United Russia 
candidates decided to nominally run as independents, 
i.e. not under ER colors, while still relying on the finan-
cial and administrative resources provided by the party. 
According to a nationwide survey conducted by Levada 
Center in August 2019, only 28 percent of Russians were 
in favor of the ER.
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A Summer of Protests
The decision to ban many opposition politicians from 
the elections made the otherwise fragmented opposition 
movement join forces and organize protests. The first major 
demonstration in Moscow took place on July 20, followed 
by a series of protests held every Saturday. Some of these 
marches mobilized up to 30.000 or 40.000 people, which 
by Moscow standards makes them large demonstrations.
Protests took place not only in Moscow, but also in 
many other cities, including Tomsk, Saratov, Makhachka-
la and Novosibirsk, altogether well above 130 towns. Most 
of these demonstrations only had a few hundred partici-
pants and therefore clearly did not represent the majority 
of the society. Nevertheless, the fact that dissatisfaction 
was expressed nationwide is significant.
Yet only a minority is ready to join the protests—since 
2018, approximately a quarter of the population. Accord-
ing to the polls, in September 2019 about half of Rus-
sians were neutral about the protests, while 23 percent 
of the respondents were positive, and 25 percent had a 
negative opinion.
Hence it is reasonable to see the latest demonstrations 
in Moscow and the other Russian cities as part of a series 
of issue-based protests, which have been going on since 
the beginning of 2018. From this perspective, there is a 
red thread running from the pension reform of 2018, the 
so-called garbage protest in early 2019, and the demon-
strations in Yekaterinburg against building a cathedral in 
the middle of the city’s most popular park, to the election 
demonstrations of this past summer.
Reactions from the Regime
President Vladimir Putin’s regime reacted to the Moscow 
protests with a complex set of forceful measures, sweet-
ened by a few softer actions, such as music and food 
festivals that took place at the same time as the protests 
in order to lure people away. Mostly, however, the re-
gime resorted to force. Police used massive, widespread 
violence against the protestors, arresting thousands of 
people including bystanders. A number of detainees 
received harsh sentences that clearly were intended to 
deter others from taking part in the protests. For example, 
a young activist, Konstantin Kotov was sentenced to four 
years’ imprisonment for attending two demonstrations. 
Nearly all opposition leaders were arrested for shorter pe-
riods, but several times in a row, including Sobol, Yashin, 
and Navalny, who suffered a mysterious, sudden allergic 
reaction while in jail.
It is worth noting, as Mark Galeotti did, that the secu-
rity forces were disciplined and showed no sign of hesita-
tion about executing their orders. It was also obvious 
that the regime used only the level of violence it deemed 
necessary and did not rely on the many harsher means 
such as rubber bullets or water cannons at its disposal.
The Vote and Its Results
Partly as a reaction to the repressions, Navalny in late 
August suggested to change strategy and concentrate on 
tactical voting instead of continuing the protests, a strat-
egy developed back in November 2018. Navalny’s proposal 
initially came as a surprise but ended up being endorsed 
by most opposition supporters. The Navalny team devel-
oped a website called Smart Voting (Umnoe golosovanie) 
to concentrate protest votes on the strongest non-ER 
candidates. The novelty was to support even candidates 
belonging to the “systemic opposition” as long as he or 
she had a chance to win.
The vote itself was conducted mostly in a calm and 
orderly way, though there were widespread cases of ballot 
stuffing, grossly uneven access to the media, and other ir-
regularities. The electronic voting system tested in some 
precincts of Moscow malfunctioned multiple times. The 
average turnout was 41.25 percent, 3.5 points higher than 
for the regional elections held last year. 
All governors managed to retain their positions. The 
ruling party also kept its dominance in all the regional 
legislative assemblies except Khabarovsk Krai. Almost 
everywhere, however, ER performed worse than in 2014. 
In Moscow, candidates running for the ruling party 
won a total of 25 seats, while twenty mandates went to 
opposition politicians: thirteen seats to the Communist 
Party and three to Just Russia, which are both part of the 
systemic opposition. The real change is that the liberal 
Yabloko party also won four seats. This means that the 
non-systemic—the genuine—opposition made it into the 
city’s Duma for the first time since 2005. The Smart Vot-
ing strategy of the opposition turned out to be a spectacu-
lar success. Though direct causality is hard to prove, the 
fact is that all twenty opposition candidates who were 
elected to the Moscow Duma were politicians recom-
mended by Smart Voting.
Conclusions
The long-lasting public discontent with United Russia 
has translated into weaker institutional positions for 
the party, mainly in Moscow, but to a lesser extent also 
in the regions. Yet to speak about any kind of a liberal 
opposition breakthrough would be an exaggeration. In 
fact, ER managed to preserve all of its governor positions 
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as well as its absolute majority in the Moscow City Duma. 
A majority of Russians voted either for the ruling party 
or for systemic opposition forces. Moreover, many of the 
communist politicians supported by Navalny’s Smart Vot-
ing are in fact Stalinists. The fact that they do not belong 
to ER does not make them more democratic.
Another important outcome is the series of electoral 
compromises between systemic and non-systemic op-
position forces that was reflected by the Smart Voting 
campaign. If this cooperation continues, it is likely to lead 
to a fundamental transformation of the Russian party 
system: with the next State Duma elections in 2021 and 
particularly the 2024 presidential elections in mind, the 
Kremlin has a strong incentive to start reshuffling the 
party system, 
Meanwhile, none of the economic, financial, and social 
problems that motivated the series of protests in 2018-
2019 and massively eroded the popularity of both the 
ruling party and the government have been solved. The 
opposition, through its newly won positions in Moscow, 
will have access to lot more information. These insights 
will allow to more effectively criticize the ruling party of 
corruption. It is also highly likely that opposition forces 
will increasingly rely on tactical voting strategies.
Over the coming months and years, the regime is likely 
to use spectacular, heavy-handed repressive measures 
to keep the protest potential under control and prevent 
a Maydan-type scenario. Actions may well include even 
more comprehensive surveillance, more detentions, and 
raids as well as further draconian legislation and stricter 
application of the laws already in place. 
In fact, a few days after the elections, on 12 September, 
a large-scale, nationwide police action was conducted in 
altogether 42 cities against offices of Navalny’s Anti-Cor-
ruption Foundation on charges of money-laundering. Rus-
sian security forces confiscated numerous computers and 
personal bank accounts of activists were blocked. The 
offices of the Golos monitoring organization in Kazan and 
Saratov were also searched. These latest developments 
suggest an increasing crackdown on the non-systemic op-
position in the near future.
All in all, the 2019 regional elections did not resolve 
any of the inherent structural tensions. Instead, it made 
them more visible. With the lines blurring between 
systemic and non-systemic opposition and given the need 
of the regime to react to these changes, we can expect 
Russia’ political life to become increasingly dynamic as 
the next Duma and presidential elections are slowly ap-
proaching.
Dr András Rácz is Senior Research Fellow on Russia for 
the Robert Bosch Center for Central and Eastern Europe, 
Russia, and Central Asia at the German Council on For-
eign Relations (DGAP).
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